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Summary
The first two decades of South Africa's history is characterised as a period of serious
endemic industrial unrest and violence, when the labour movement and capital were involved
in regular conflict over labour issues and for control of the country's industrial work force.
The level of violence in these conflicts was such that the government as a third party was
repeatedly forced to intervene in the disputes and restore law and order by imposing martial
law. This paper explores labour's attitude and responses to, as well as the consequences for
labour, of the government's declarations of martial law during these disputes and in the First
World War.
1. Prologue to Martial Law: The First Military Interventions in Industrial Disputes
In the early decades of the 20th century no problem loomed so large as the labour problem.
The scope and gravity of strikes were increasing. Industrial enterprises became concentrated
in huge businesses, and those who ran them refused to make agreements which would allow
trade unions to curtail their freedom; they were unwilling to share their authority. Without
exception these business enterprises were hostile to the principle of collective bargaining.
Skilled workers, who needed three years of apprenticeship, and more of practice to train,
became the minority, overwhelmed by specialised unskilled workers who could be underpaid.
Thus action by the workers was tending to become political just at the time when the
nature of the state was changing. As the sate itself became more and more an employer, with
numerous officials and workers, governments had to decide whether they could stand by
while strikes spread to vital sectors in the nation's life. A state whose railwaymen, postmen,
and miners were on strike was threatened with paralysis and could therefore ill-afford to
stand aloof from industrial disputes. The strike, as a manifestation of collective action by
workers, was more and more becoming a warning signal to invite the authorities to intervene
actively and military intervention in industrial disputes often had bloody results. I
In the cosmopolitan mining community of the early da~s of the Witwatersrand gold-
mine industry, immigrants of British origin predominated. The predominantly British
character of the miners, the habits of the British workshop and the tradition of the British
trade unions established themselves on the Witwatersrand.3 Both the trade union and political
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wings of the (white) South African labour movement were established by immigrants and
they were organised in the same way as were similar bodies and movements in Britain.4
The predominantly British model of industrial relations that was imported to South
Africa is often characterised as the "adversary system" as opposed to the "conciliatory
system" of the European continent. Matters such as mining regulations and safety, miner's
phthisis, workmen's compensation, the eight-hour work day, prohibition of Sunday work, job
reservation for whites and the retention of job colour bars in industry were the contentious
issues of negotiation and dispute in the relationship between trade unions and employer
organisations, such as the Chamber of Mines.s Therefore, as this paper shall highlight, the
first two decades of 20th-century South African labour history is characterised as one of
political turmoil as well as of large scale and serious endemic industrial unrest as part of a
cathartic process in which the relationship between the state and its subjects in the field of
labour took shape.
The first incident that exemplified the increasing intervention of the government in
industrial disputes occurred during the general miner's strike of 1907 on the Witwatersrand.
The strike started on the Knight's Deep Goldmine on I May and eventually spread to more
than fifty other mines. It was encouraged by the Transvaal Miner's Association (TMA). The
strike, which lasted until 28 July 1907, involved more than 4 000 white underground
mineworkers. The immediate cause of the strike was that the white miners were called upon
to supervise three, instead of two, rock drilling machines. This was an attempt by the mining
companies to cut down working costs by reducing the number of overseers and the miners
were aware of the implications for white labour. In order to curb the disturbance General JC
Smuts, then colonial secretary of the Transvaal, called in imperial troops such as the 2nd
Dragoon Guards. Approximately 1 400 imperial troops were posted on the mines to protect
mining property and scab labour and to chase away the pickets.6
Smuts's conduct in the 1907 strike served as a prelude to ensuing conflicts between
capital and labour and in which the state would be compelled to intervene as a result of
industrial disputes. The next trail of strength between capital and the state on the one hand
and labour on the other took place in 1913. The immediate causes of the 1913 miner's strike
started with the appointment of a new manager on the New Kleinfontein Mine near Benoni at
the beginning of May. It was also a deliberate move on the part of the mining company to
increase its profits by tightening up conditions on the mine. The new manager's first act was
to alter the hours of work of underground mechanics who thereby lost their Saturday half
holiday. Five of the men concerned refused to comply and left the mine on 10 May 1913,
whereupon their trade union, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, issued instructions to
their members not to take the jobs vacated. Bulman, the new manager, then appointed five
non-trade unionists in their places and he refused to reinstate the mechanics who had left.
After some other white miners at New Kleinfontein refused to work on 26 May, the majority
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of the white workers at the mine voted to support them. A strike was declared and a strike
committee was appointed by the miners.7
The management, however, refused to negotiate with the strike committee. On II
June 1913 the management re-opened the mine and took on strike-breakers, or "scabs", to do
the work. The strike-breakers were assaulted by the strikers and the strike spread to other
mines. By the beginning of July 1913 19 000 white workers from the gold mines and power
stations were on strike and all the mines on the Witwatersrand ceased operating. The Minister
of Mines, FS Malan, remained confident that the two parties concerned could settle the
dispute without government interference, but underestimated the gravity of the situation on
the Reef.8
Indeed, the tone of The Worker, the official organ of the South African Labour Party
(SALP), became increasingly militant. In the issue of 3 July 1913 the paper declared:
"War having been declared in the shape ofa general strike on the Rand ...The War has
now got to be fought, not 'to a finish', as the phrase goes, but to a victory, neither
death nor any other alternative being accepted. And it can be done; though it will
need more than a Rand strike to do it. For victory means bringing the South African
public, and in particular the Union Parliament, to its senses and its knees, and
extorting substantial legislation in the worker's interest. It is no use saying the strike
will last a week: it must last untill the result is secured ...We can still be
'constitutional', that is avoid common crime like murder or arson; but now it is war,
the shoe has got to be made to pinch everywhere as tight as it will go, untill they cry
for mercy, and really, once it is war, the things usually called murder, arson,
destruction of property, and so on, become the principle occupation of armies, and
there is no reason in principle, but only in tactics, why they should not be included in
the various forms of acute pressure which have to be exercised in industrial war".9
It was general JC Smuts, a former Minister of Mines and in 1913 the Minister of
Defence and of Finance and acting Minister of Justice, who was to play the leading role on
government side in the strike. His meeting with the leaders of the strikers on 22 June 1913
was unsuccessful in resolving the deadlock which had arisen between the forces of capital
and labour.1o Smuts, fearing that the police force could not cope adequately with the
situation, had called once again on the imperial garrison in South Africa because the Union
Defence Force, although established in 1912, had not as yet been properly constituted. The
troops were to protect the mines, power stations, municipal buildings, railway stations and
certain private properties against possible attacks from the strikers. The police force was
augmented with infantry from units such as the Royal Scots Fusiliers, the Bedfordshire
Regiment, the Royal Engineers, the South African Staffordshire Regiment, as well as cavalry
detachments from the Tenth Royal Hussars, the First Royal Dragoons, the South African
Mounted Riflemen and the Zuidafrikaanse Bereden Schutters. The Royal Field Artillery was
also involved. Eventually 2 853 policemen, I 681 special constables, 2 910 imperial troops
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and 670 members of the citizen force were deployed on the affected areas of the
Witwatersrand. I I
The strike reached its climax on 4 and 5 July 1913. Violence started in the Market
Square, Johannesburg on the afternoon of 4 July, when a crowd started stoning the police and
a squadron of Royal Dragoons who tried to disperse them. The mob set fire to the goods shed
at the railway premises and burnt down the premises of The Star (the mouthpiece of the
Chamber of Mines). Corner House (the mining house of H. Eckstein & Co., considered by
the strikers to be a symbol of capitalism) was also attacked when the military and the police
opened fire there to try to resore order. The mob looted gun shops and arms and ammunition
were distributed. On 5 July 1913 Generals Botha (the Prime Minister) and Smuts arrived in a
Johannesburg torn by violence which resulted in the police firing into a mob outside the Rand
Club. Altogether 25 people, including innocent bystanders, were killed during the unrest.
Others including policemen and soldiers were wounded.12 In addition, the military
headquarters in Pretoria ordered the revocation of the publication of all newspapers on the
Witwatersrand for three days.13
In commemoration of the civilian casualties, who had been killed during the
shootings, a number of Rand dailies decided jointly to issue a special paper, The News, on
Monday 7 July 1913, the day of the victims' funerals.14 The News reflected the strikers'
strong feeling of resentment at the use of imperial troops during the unrest. The paper
published a list of the deceased victims under the headline: "Slaughtered by England's Is a
day assasins".15 The Worker also presented a harsh image of the shooting at the Rand Club:
" ...the most indescribable scene of cold-blooded brutality ever perpetrated in an
industrial conflict...defenceless individuals, including women and children ...were
picked off at pleasure, sometimes without sufficient or any warning ...!t was a
calculated, long-drawn murder...an outrage more callous than anything done in war
time: a crime which must alter, has already begun to alter the course of this country's
social and political history; a diabolical horror which the working class of the Rand
will NEVER FORGET and NEVER FORGIVE".16
After conferring with representatives of the Chamber of Mines, Botha and Smuts met
with a deputation of strike leaders, consisting of A. Watson, J.T. Bain, T. Matthews and J.
Hindman, in the Carlton Hotel to effect a settlement. It was agreed that all the strikers would
be reinstated and that a judicial committee would be appointed to investigate the workers'
grievances. The strikebreakers were to be dismissed but were to be paid a year's salary at
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government expense. Although not all trade unionists were satisfied, the strike was over and
the forces of labour had apparently gained a victory. 17
General Smuts, however, considered the settlement to be a personal humiliation and a
defeat for the government forces. Of J.T.Bain, the secretary of the strike committee, Smuts
told Parliament later: "This was the hardest thing I have done in my life - to put my signature
together with that ofMr. Bain". Smuts was determined not to be caught unprepared again. He
accelerated the organising and training of the Defence Force to be ready the next time should
a new industrial upheaval appear.18
2. The 1914 General Strike and the Declaration of Martial Law
Indeed, the next industrial dispute between capital and labour in which the government would
intervene was only a few months away. According to De Kiewiet, the general strike of 1914
was a continuation and extent ion of the 1913 strike and was aimed at protecting the interests
of white labour.19 Industrial relations remained tense for the rest of 1913. Railwaymen had
not come out on strike as a body in 1913. Yet their dissatisfaction increased when the cabinet
minister in charge of their department, Henry Burton, and the general manager, William Hoy,
made it evident by the end of that year that retrenchment of railway workshop employees had
become an economic necessity.2o
In reaction to these announcements the executive of the Amalgamated Society of
Railway and Harbours Servants (ASRHS) issued instructions to their members throughout
the country to strike unless the government renounced its retrenchments and re-employed
dismissed workers. The union's general secretary, HJ Poutsma, asked the Transvaal
Federation of Trade Unions to call a general strike. On 13 January 1914 the Federation
obliged and took control of the strike. Railway employees from workshops in Pretoria,
Johannesburg, Bloemfontein, Durban and Salt River in the Cape Peninsula, as well as
coalminers in Natal, were on strike. Acts of sabotage to railway lines were also committed.
This time, however, in anticipation of another fracas that might develop between
capital and labour, the government was fully prepared to deal with the situation. Already
during the night of7 and 8 January 1914 the most important railway centres in the Transvaal
affected by the strike were put under police protection. On 9 January a number of trade union
leaders were arrested and the police confiscated documents at the ASRHS's headquarters in
Pretoria. By Proclamation NO.8 of 1914 sales of arms and ammunition in certain Transvaal
magisterial districts were prohibited for one month. On 10 January 18 units of the Active
Citizen Force, 36 burgher commandos from the Transvaal, the Free State, Natal and the Cape
Province, police forces, as well as a number of special constables and volunteers - in all 10
000 troops - were mobilised. The implications of these deployments were that prior to the
Federation's declaration of a general strike on the evening of 13 January 1914 involving over
20 000 strikers, troops were already in predetermined positions to take control of the affected
areas effectively.21
17
18
'9
20
21
S.B.Spies,op. cit., p.81; I.L.Walker & B. Weinbren. op. cit., pp.36-37.
H.C. Armstrong, Grey Steel. J.c. Smuts A Study in Arrogance (Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, Seventh
Edition, 1940), pp.224-226.
C.W. de Kiewiet op. cit., p.168.
S.B. Spies, op. cit., p.83.
Cd 7348-1914 Union of South Africa: Correspondence relating to the recenl General Strike in South
Africa, pp.46-47, 91; F.S. Crafford, Jan Smuts A Biography (Doubleday, Doran & Co., New York,
1944), p.92; C.J.Jacobs, 'Die Rol van die Unieverdedigingsmag in die Onderdrukking van die
146
As was to be expected, the labour movement protested against the deployment of
government forces and the arrest of labour leaders. A Cape Town meeting of railway
employees resolved: "This meeting of citizens condemns the action of the Government in
calling out the Defence Force to endeavour to overawe the workers, and in illegally arresting
the Labour leaders in Johannesburg and Pretoria, and calls for the immediate disbandment of
the Defence Force and the release of the leaders".22 And a meeting of the Johannesburg
district committee of the SALP condemned "the avowed intention of the Government to
crush the labour government by brute force".23
[n an address to a crowd of 4 000 workers in front of the Trades Hall in Fordsburg,
Johannesburg, the headquarters of the Transvaal Federation of Trades, one of the strike
leaders used the issue of war as metaphor, as did The Worker during the 19[3-strike, to
describe in militant terms the confrontation between labour and the government::
"There is a war to the knife. It is absolutely a war of the classes. There is no
distinction as to race, creed or colour. The whole of the workers are against the
Government, and if the railwaymen go down now the whole of recognised affiliated
labour throughout South Africa will go down. [fwe go down this time it is the end of
us, and if the other side go down it is the end of the Government. ..[ can promise you
the end of this fight will be victory for the workers and the end of the Government,
and placi~f in power of a Government that will truly represent the feeling of the
workers".
On [4 January 1914 the government proclaimed martial law in certain magisterial
districts of the Transvaal, the Free State and Natal.25 Commandos under Generals JH de la
Rey and CF Beyers surrounded the Trades Hall where the strike leaders had entrenched
themselves. A thirteen-pounder field-gun of the Transvaal Horse Artillery was trained on the
Federation headquarters and an ultimatum was issued to the strikers to surrender. All the
members of the Federation were arrested as were hundreds of other strikers. This was
followed by the temporary arrest of prominent SALP members such as FHP Creswell, WH
Andrews, T Boydell and M Kentridge for contravening martial law regulations. By 18
January 1914 the strike had been crushed with the loss of two lives.
But General Smuts believed that certain foreign-born strike leaders were dangerous
men who had revolutionary syndicalist ideas of fomenting revolution and of overthrowing the
state by industrial action. Therefore he had nine of these men, HJ Poutsma, JT Bain, GW
Mason, W. Livingstone, A Watson, WH Morgan A Crawford, RB Waterston and D
McKerrel, removed from their cells in the dead of night on 27 January, conducted in secrecy
to a special train and taken to Durban under armed escort. There they were forcibly put
aboard the steamship Umgeni, a Bullard-King liner, which sailed from Durban for London on
the morning of 30 January. A Cape Town tug was chartered by SALP members and an
endeavour made to intercept the Umgeni and take the men off, but this expedient failed.26
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The publication of newspapers in the Transvaal were also severely affected by
restrictions imposed on them by martial law.2? For instance, the Transvaal Chronic/e, a paper
that adopted a sympathetic attitude towards labour, was threatened with closure for allegedly
violating regulations pertaining to press censorship.28 Through its organ, The Worker, the
SALP appealed to all South Africans to condemn the government's action against the
strikers. The paper declared that the government should recognise its mistakes. To avoid
public disorder the authorities should take the workers into their confidence rather than
arming one section of the population against another. Those who were arrested should be
released and the retrenchment policy regarding the railway employees should be rescinded.
The Worker also sarcastically referred to Smuts as " ... the Great General, the unrivalled War
Minister, who call out 70 000 men [sic] when there is no enemy - has he been giving orders
to take action so to irritate the men that some may resist and he be able to pretend that the
Rand population is a ruffianly, rebellious people?,,29 As a result, the paper was forced to
closure under martial law regulations for a period of two months as from the issue of 15
January 1914.30
As in the case of the strike of 1913, the strikers in the general strike of 1914 also
published their own strike paper in Johannesburg. In January 1914 a "Special 'Strike' Daily
Edition" of The Weekly Gazette, a one-penny worker's sheet edited by Fred Horak, who was
also a member of the SALP, was published. The paper was explicitly pro-labour and anti-
capitalistic.3l The Gazette strongly identified with the cause of the railway employees during
the strike and kept the strikers abreast of the latest developments in the various strike centres.
The government's conduct was criticised and the paper stated that the strikers were against
the use ofviolence.32
The daily strike editions of The Weekly Gazette appeared on Wednesday 14 January
1914 for the last time. The editor declared that owing to the proclamation of martial law the
editorial staff was unable to offer any criticism on the strike situation. Therefore they were
unable to publish certain items. On 26 January Horak was charged with contravening
Regulation 5 of martial law stipulations, the allegation being that on 15 January he
"wrongfully and unlawfully printed, published or circulated a pamphlet, leaflet or other
document containing words or information calculated to promote disaffection or excite ill-
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feeling". Consequently he was kept in gaol for eleven days, but was discharged after trail and
the weekly publication of The Weekly Gazette was resumed on 16 March 1914.33
Following the example of the Johannesburg strikers, a strike committee of the Pretoria
branch of the South African Typographical Union (SATU) also decided to publish a strike
leaflet on 17 January 1914 with 1.L. Walker, the branch secretary, as editor. The short-lived
Pretoria Strike Herald was distributed free of charge. The first impression produced 10 000
copies and there was a great demand for more. The Herald contained items on trade union
resolutions regarding the strike, general strike news as well as news on the surrender of the
strike leaders in the Fordsburg Trades Hall. It also induced the workers to remain on strike.
However, after the appearance of the first edition the police raided the Pretoria Strike
Herald works. Members of the printing staff were arrested on the premises and, like Horak of
The Weekly Gazette, charged under martial law with printing matter "calculated to promote
disaffection or excite ill-feeling". They were also charged with contravening martial law
regulations because the Herald allegedly stated prematurely that the burgher forces were
going to be demobilised. During the raid the police confiscated and broke all the printing-
forms and galleys for the type already set for the second edition of the Herald scheduled for
18 January 1914. A few days later Walker, the editor, was also arrested and charged under
martial law with sedition. Eventually the leaflet's printing staff were fined penalties ranging
between £20 and £25, while Walker was sentenced to imprisonment for one month without
the option on one charge and fined £25 or one month on another. The Pretoria branch of the
SATU paid the fines of all its members who were charged.34
Although the government forces gained the upper hand in the industrial upheaval of
1914, Smuts over-estimated the outer limits of his powers under martial law with regard to
the nine deported strike leaders. This arbitrary action caused an outcry in labour circles in
South Africa and Britain. Smuts acknowledged that the deportations were illegal, but
explained to Parliament that the proclamation of martial law was necessitated by food
shortages on the Witwatersrand as a result of the railway strike, the precarious situation that
prevailed with idle black workers in the mining compounds, the threat of property and
installations being dynamited by strike extremists, as well as an alleged revolutionary
"syndicalist plot" by strike leaders to overthrow the government. Therefore Parliament
sanctioned his actions with the passing of the Indemnity and Undesirables Special
Importation Act, No. I of 1914, despite rigorous protest from the SALP.35
Smuts also introduced a Peace Preservation Bill in Parliament. However, The Worker
condemned the bill in the strongest terms claiming that, if it should become law, the workers'
rights and liberties would be at stake. The bill made provision for legalising martial law under
a so-called "control system". The system could be proclaimed at any time and its application
meant the abolition of all citizen rights, inviolability of the home and of correspondence, free
speech and assembly, striking, picketing, ect. The Worker even hinted that should the bill be
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passed foreign workers could consider boycotting South African export products in sympathy
with their South African fellow-workers. In the outcry that followed and under fierce SALP
attacks, the bill was withdrawn, but a Riotous Assemblies Act was put in its place. The act
prohibited recruitment to unions by force, banned violent pickting and any strikes in the
public utility services, permitted magistrates to prohibit meetings thought likely to endanger
public peace, and greatly increased police powers of law enforcement.36 Ironically the nine
deported strike leaders were brought back to the Union several months later at government
expense.37
3. The labour anti-warites and martial law during the First World War
By 1914 the SALP was at its peak. As a result of the government's bloody suppression of the
Witwatersrand 1913 miner's strike, the smothering of the 1914 general strike by martial law
and the subsequent deportation of nine strike leaders, Labour ranks swelled with new
adherents. The SALP's victory in the March 1914 Transvaal provincial elections was an
index of its strength. However, the euphoria generated by these successes concealed the
simmering tensions inside the Labour Party. In the more general questions on the means to
achieve socialism and the attitude of the party in the event of a "capitalist" war, the
conservative right-wing and socialist left-wing of the party continued to compromise
uneasily. Therefore the advent of the First World War in August 1914 was most inopportune
for the SALP. Differences on the party's policy towards the war would eventually create an
irrevocable breach and rupture in the ranks of the labour movement.38
The Worker, swayed by Britain's entry into the War, expressed an unequivocal pro-
war attitude and the majority of SALP members supported the Union's war r61e.39 But the
opponents of South African participation in the war did not remain idle either. On 25 August
1914 the pacifist section within the party founded the War on War League. C. Wade was
chairman, P.R.Roux secretary, and S.P.Bunting treasurer. The only qualification for
membershir was the signing of a pledge "to oppose this or any other war at all times and at
all costs".4 The first of thirteen issues of the League's paper - The War on War Gazette - a
printed four-page weekly edited by S.P.Bunting, appeared on 19 September 1914.41 The
paper explained the League's policy towards war as follows:
"If we are ask what is our policy, one answer is, so far a criticism can do it, to
stimulate that thinking and to combat the war orators' invitations to shut our eyes and
plunge ...We of the War on War League have come together from parties and schools,
united in a pledge which becomes daily more convinced andmore determined, to
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'oppose this and any othe war'. We publish this Gazette in order to give publicity to
all the different considerations on which, and all the different methods by which, it is
to be opposed ... We have aimed rather at indicating what are conceived by one or
another, here and elsewhere in the world, to be the causes and resulting remedies for
war; the futile and false ideals and criminal purposes which underlie it; the means to
be taken to defeat it".42
Naturally, therefore, the Gazette concentrated on anti-war issues. Prominent anti-war
labourites wrote articles strongly denouncing the war and the Botha government's
participation in it. The conduct of the town Benoni, which during the strikes of 1913 and
1914 was still considered to be "the hotbed of class war" and "the nursery of revolution", but
in response to the outbreak of the war formed a labour legion, was severely condemned. The
paper alleged that the Union's Defence Force was "despotic" and would "smash democracy"
and "take freedom of speech away". The Gazette encouraged its readers to send the editor
any information on "enforced recruitng and voluteering and the like".43
In addition, anti-war articles by prominent international labour and socialist leaders,
such as Karl Kautsky, J. Ramsay McDonald and Prince Kropotkin published in labour and
socialst newspapers abroad, were frequently reprinted in The War on War Gazette.
Endeavours by Italian, Dutch and American socialists to organise international socialist
conferences in an effort to end the war were also welcomed by the Gazette. The protests of
Russian socialists, as well as the prominent German anti-war socialists Karl Liebknecht and
Rosa Luxemburg, were held as examples to South African anti-warites to follow. On the
other hand, the paper criticised the pro-war attitudes of the British Labour Party and the
German Social Democratic Party. The gist of the Gazette's articles was that only large
international capitalists and arms manufacturers benefited from the war at the expense of the
working class.4
When the Afrikaner Rebellion of October 1914 broke out in protest against the Botha
government's invasion of German South West Africa as part of its contribution to the British
war effort, the War on War League proposed to General Smuts, the Minister of Defence, and
to Lord Buxton, the Governor-General of South Africa, that it would act as a neutral mediator
between the government and the rebels. The offer was, however, declined by both persons45
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But The War on War Gazette's constant bitter criticism of the war issue started to
annoy the authorities. Referring to the tenth issue of the Gazette the Secretary for Justice
made a formal in2uiry to the Secretary of Defence whether the paper should not be banned
under martial law 6, which was proclaimed on 12 October 1914 over the whole of the Union
and troops were commandeered to suppress the Rebellion.47 In the issue involved the Gazette
stated that it preached the Sixth Commandment in The Bib/e. "Thou shalt not kill". Sharp
criticism was also expressed against martial law:
"".under cover of Martial Law the regime of serfdom is closing in on us more rapidly
than ever. Looking back on the Martial Law cases of the past year or so, we see that
we have no longer an independent magistracy, and that our Courts are becoming to be
recognised as mere instruments of vengeance on the political or economic opponents
of capitalism".48
Cope alleges that the government feared the rising influence of the War on War
League's anti-war propaganda among the public. Apparently the League and the media
censor, Hugh Wyndham, differed on the interpretation of the Sixth Commandment in terms
of the war situation and its publication in the Gazette. Therefore the paper, as Cope puts it,
was "censored out of existence". Eventually The War on War Gazette was forced to close at
the end of November 1914.49 A notice in the last issue on 28 November 1914 sarcastically
hinted at the interference by the censor:
"We regret that owing to an unforseen interposition of Divine Providence
and a consequent unusual pressure on our space we are compelled to
disappoint our readers unavoidably by a slight delay in the publication of
this issue and a crowding out of many articles and items of the type and
standard which readers hace come to expect".50
4. Government by Martial Law: The Rand Revolt of 1922
The year 1922 saw the biggest and bloodiest industrial upheaval in South African labour
history, which took on the appearance of a civil war on the Witwatersrand. This strike, which
was characterised by pitched battles between armed forces of labour and the state, was
initiated by a world-wide depression towards the end of 1920 causing the price of gold to
drop in 1921. This in turn affected the gold mining industry adversely amidst rising costs of
gold production. The wage bill was the one area in which costs could be cut to meet rising
expenditure and this made semi-skilled employment the most sensitive area, for blacks and
whites were commonly employed in these tasks. In November 1921, in face of the growing
economic crisis, the Chamber of Mines gave notice of its intention to abandon the status quo
agreement by eliminating a colour bar that protected white labour in any semi-skilled job. In
its deliberations with the Chamber of Mines over the wage issue the South African Industrial
Federation (founded in the wake of the 1914 general strike) could not handle developments
on the gold mines in isolation, because the Chamber's abandonment of the status quo
46
47
48
49
'0
(SAB) JUS Vol. 394, file no. 1/424/14, War on War Gazette: Secretary for Justice-Secretary of
Defence, 30.11.1914 (no. 1/424/14).
D.W.Kruger, The Age of the Generals. A Short Political History of the Union of South Africa. 191(}-
1948 (Dagbreek Book Store, 1958), p.89.
The War on War Gazelle, 21.11.1914, pp.I-2 (The Time to Strike!).
R.K.Cope, op. cit., p.166. See also (SAB) JUS Vol. 394, file no. 1/424/14, War on War Gazette: H.
Wyndham-Secretary for Justice, 1.12.1914 (no. 179/23/5/121).
The War on War Gazelle, 28.11.1914, p.1 (To Our Readers).
152
agreement coincided with a new bid by the coal-owners to depress wages and a refusal by the
Victoria Falls Power Company to agree to higher wage demands. Therefore wage
negotiations between the SAIF and the Chamber repeatedly broke down.
Meanwhile Percy Fisher, the irregularly elected and subsequently deposed secretary
of the South African Mine Worker's Union, announced the formation of a new and militant
miners' Council of Action that would push the wage issue to extreme levels with
revolutionary intent. Thus pressured, the SAIF balloted its members and brought the
coalminers out on 2 January 1922 and the goldminers, engineers and power-workers out on
the 10th. It placed the direction of the strike in the hands of an augmented executive and
organised the strikers into unofficial commandos across the Witwatersrand and in the country
districts to meet force with foce. The impasse between the Chamber of Mines and the SAIF
created the conditions under which the revolutionary Council Of Action could seize the
initiative and force the SAIF to proclaim a general strike on 7 March 1922 when 22 000
workers were on strike. By that time violence and sabotage had already broken out on the
Rand.51
Initially the government was reluctant to intervene in the dispute and to declare
martial law as it was uncertain about the loyalty of the burgher commandos that would
constitute an integral part of the Union Defence Force's mobilisation plans. Many members
of these commandos could either be strike sympathisers or members of the Nationalist Party
(NP) that also sympathised with the strikers, or even be strikers themselves. By February
1922, as a result of increasing violence by strike commandos, the police started to recruit a
citizen guard to patrol the streets of Johannesburg and to protect buildings and property.
However, after a general strike was proclaimed on 7 March, it became evident that the police
could not deal with the situation. Already by 28 February reinforcements from the Defence
Force departed for the Rand. Between 8 and 9 March the Transvaal Horse Artillery, the
Transvaal Scottish, the Imperial Light Horse, the South African Medical Corps, members of
the Railway and Harbours Brigade, the Pretoria Regiment and the Durban Light Infantry
were commandeered.
However, when law and order collapsed, General Smuts, then Prime Minister of the
Union, had no choice but to proclaim martial law on 10 March 1922 in all Witwatersrand and
some adjacent districts. Simultaneously units of the Active Citizen Force and Citizen Reserve
were mobilised by Proclamation No. 51 of 1922. These included the Witwatersrand Rifles,
the Rand Light Infantry, the South African Service Corps, more units of the South African
Medical Corps, as well as 26 burgher commandos from districts affected by martial law.
Influenced by Brig.-Gen. Coen Brits and Lt.-Gen. Sir Jaap van Deventer, both veterans from
the Anglo Boer War and other campaigns, the overwhelming majority of the burgher
commandos reacted positively to the government's call Up.52
In 1922 the labour press, as during the strikes of 1913 and 1914, formed an integral
part of the workers' struggle against capital. Even before the proclamation of martial law The
International, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), advocated a
militant approach towards the government and the Chamber of Mines:
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"The answer to the challenge of the Government as expressed in the House of
Assembly, must be to EXTEND THE FIGHT, spread the movement, dissipate the
forces of the enemy, and create a situation in South Africa which will force the
Government for its own safety to stop the struggle by offering some reasonable terms
of settlement to the men, and forcing the Chamber of Mines to come off its
pedestal" .53
It came as no surprise therefore when the government, after the proclamation of
martial law, clamped down on the offices of the CPSA in the Trades Hall in Fordsburg. The
police confiscated documents, books and pamphlets and the CPSA's press was damaged
beyond repair. W.H.Andrews and S.P.Bunting, who edited the paper, were arrested and held
in the Johannesburg Fort for the remainder of the strike. For ten weeks, from the beginning of
March until the end of May 1922, The International was suppressed by the authorities.
Andrews and Bunting were eventually released and acquitted ofa charge of public violence.54
On 13 February 1922 the first issue of a so-called "strike paper", Transvaal Post
edited by W.F.Mondriaan, appeared.55 This bilingual daily championed the cause of white
labour during the strike, especially Afrikaner workers with leanings towards the NP and pro-
SALP English workers. For the Transvaal Post the cardinal issue was the clarion call for a
"white South Africa". Therefore it implied the preservation of the colour bar in the mining
industry as the "only solution" to the strike. Smuts and the Chamber of Mines were severely
denounced for their support for the abolition of the colour bar. The Transvaal Post was
distributed very effectively by strike committees on the Witwatersrand, even to areas where
normal modes of transport were disrupted as a result of the strike. As the paper provided
strike news and support for the strike it became immensely popular with the working class on
the Rand. Mondriaan claimed that 26 000 copies were sold daily.56
As a result of the proclamation of martial law on 10 March 1922, publication of the
Transvaal Post was prohibited and the police raided its offices and printing press. Apparently
the government regarded its contents to be revolutionary and seditious. Mondriaan, the editor,
was arrested and detained in Johannesburg. After he was released on bail he fled to
Mozambique, where he remained for three months. When martial law was repealed,
Mondriaan returned to South Africa. However, in his absence the Transvaal Post went
bankrupt and would never appear again.57 Oberholster claims that Mondriaan was also
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involved in a failed plot, as a prelude to a coup, to raid an arsenal at military headquarters in
Pretoria. 58
In the meantime strike commandos attacked the police across the Witwatersrand. At
Dunswart on the East Rand strikers attacked the Transvaal Scottish. From Brixton Ridge in
Johannesburg strikers fired upon the Transvaal Horse Artillery and a surprise attack was
launched on the Imperial Light Horse at Ellispark. The latter was relieved by the Durban
Light Infantry. Machine gun attacks were launched and bombs dropped on strike positions in
Benoni and Brakpan by government aeroplanes. On 12 March 1922 Gen. Van Deventer
launched a counter-offensive on the East Rand and took Benoni and Brakpan the following
day. A combined force of Gen. Van Deventer and Brits occupied Springs on 14 March.
Thereafter the East Rand was secured.
Also on the West Rand government forces attacked from II March and by 14 March
were in control of Krugersdorp, Roodepoort, Florida and Langlaagte in Johannesburg.
Aeroplanes machine-gunned and bombed the strike positions in Brixton while the Transvaal
Horse Artillery opened a bombardment on adjacent positions. Companies of the Durban
Light Infantry relieved policemen in positions that were surrounded by strike commandos.
However, the Transvaal Scottish took heavy casualties in the skirmish. In Fordsburg strikers
were fortified in trenches and behind barricades surrounding the Trades Hall. On 14 March
heavy fighting took place between strike commandos and government forces using cannon of
the Transvaal Horse Artillery, machine guns and a Whippet tank. The Durban Light Infantry,
the Rand Light Infantry, the Transvaal Scottish and burgher commandos were also involved
in the fighting. Inevitably the strike commandos had to succumb to the superior numbers and
fire power of the government forces, although two extremist ringleaders, Percy Fisher and
Harry Spendiff, refused to surrender and committed suicide. Although snipers were still
active in Johannesburg the siege of the Fordsburg Trades Hall, the headquarters of the strike
committee, broke the back of the strike. On 17 March 1922 the trade unions called off the
strike and the next day the demobilisation of the Citizen Reserve began.59
The general strike of 1922 took a heavy toll on human lives. Officially 43 soldiers, 86
policemen and 81 civilians were killed, while 133 soldiers, 86 policemen and 315 civilians
were wounded in the skirmishes. During and after the strike 4692 persons were arrested and
853 were tried on various charges of murder, high treason and transgression of martial law
regulations. Initially IS persons were condemned to death but eventually only four, H.K.
Hull, D.Lewis, C.C.Stassen and S.A. (Taffy) Long were hanged. The rest were sentenced
between six months and life imprisonment. A Martial Law Inquiry Judicial Commission
came to the conclusion that the government was justified in its endeavours to suppress the
strike, but Smuts had to pilot an indemnity act through Parliament to protect the government
from the consequences of its actions.6o
Economically the strikers also paid a heavy price as labour lost to mining capital.
Between 12 000 and 14000 white workers were unemployed after the strike. The wages of
semi-skilled white workers were decreased and they were replaced at an accelerated pace by
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cheaper black labourers. The statutory colour bar was no longer a guarantee for semi-skilled
white workers.61
5. Conclusion
The political consequences of the 1922 strike would impact profoundly upon the political
sphere, especially for labour and the government. Indeed, as certain extremist strike elements
sought to overthrow the government and proclaim an industrial republic62, Yudelman argues
that it was the last sustained challenge from organised white labour to the legitimacy of the
South African state up until the present as subsequent strikes never escalated in the form of a
systematic, concerted rejection of the state itelf.63
The Smuts government's "victory" over the strikers, however, proofed to be short-
lived. Smuts' bloody suppression of the strike would contribute to his own political downfall
as the resentment and hatred for him, especially in labour circles, reached fever pitch.64 Thus
The International delivered a scathing verdict on Smuts' handling of industrial unrest:"The
whole record of Smuts and his Corner House friends is one long story of dragooning an
unwilling people into submission by military force".65
The formation of an electoral alliance between the NP and the SALP, known as the
"Pact", was the most significant political outcome of the 1922 strike. The Pact would, to a
large extent, contribute to ousting from power the South African Party government in the
general election of 1924.66 The governing alliance of the Pact supported and implemented a
protectionist policy for white workers. Therefore the new government was able to wean white
labour away from industrial action by promoting a policy of job reservation in skilled trades
and also protected semi-skilled white labour.67
Rob Davies argues that the state's intervention in labour matters by means of labour
legislation in the post 1922 period effectively led to the incorporation, institutionalisation and
bureaucratisation of white unions within the state structures, thus eliminating them as a
potential militant political threat. According to Davies the Pact had succeeded in bringin&
about the almost complete political capitulation of the white labour movement to capital.6
Yudelman concurs by arguing that the interventionst state embarked upon a program to
subjugate and pacifY organised white labour by formally co-opting it into the structures of the
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state. For Yudelman, there can be no doubt that the increased role of the state did bring a
virtual end to militant white worker resistance.69
Thus the 1922 strike and its political aftermath (the 1924 election) was a watershed in
the political and economic history of the (white) South African labour movement. It
terminated an era of serious endemic industrial unrest and violence, when labour regarded
clashes with capital and the state as "war" and the armed forces of the government as its
"enemy".
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